The Battle of Suoi Tre (FSB Gold) ––––––––– 19 MAR 67 As a part of the movement of TASK FORCE FULLBACK, the 2/12th Infantry is airlifted into Landing Zone (LZ) Gold – latter Fire Support Base (FSB) Gold – along with the 3rd BN, 22nd Inf (minus Co. C), and the 2nd BN, 77th Arty (105mm). TASK FORCE FULLBACK: 2/22nd INF (Mech) (minus Co. A) 3/22nd INF [at FSB Gold] 2/12th INF Co. A, 2/34th Armor 44th Indipendant Scout Dog Co. C, 4th Engineer Battalion 25th Division, Major General C. F. Tillison III commanding 3rd Brigade, 4th Div. (Opcon to 25th Div.) Colonel Marshal B. Garth, Commanding. 2nd Bn, 12th Inf, Lt. Col. Joe F. Elliot, Commanding. •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 19 Mar (Sunday) "JUNCTION CITY. ..... In other action, Tay Ninh Prov 30 km NE Tay Ninh City at 1038H, 3d Bde 4th Inf Div unit conducting air aslt into LZ recd SA AW fire. Also, en cmd det 5 arty rds in LZ. 3 UH-1s dest 13 UH-1s hit by arty frags or ground fire. Frd cas: 14 KIA 24 WIA. Day's results: 61 EK." [Source: MACV Office of Information MACCI-P 16 April 1967 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS – MARCH 1967 pg. 11 (a.k.a. MACV Press Release or "the Five O'clock Follies.")] ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ––––––––– 20 MAR 67 The 2nd of the 12th moved west of FSB Gold on a 'Seach & Destroy' operation. Co. C veteran (Sgt.) Les Cooper recalls, "Prior to us going in to the LZ [on the 19th] we had lost a couple of choppers. There were command detonated mines (or least that was what we were told). We finally arrived at the LZ; dug in; spent the night and then moved out. On our way out we found a base camp that looked likeit was being set up as a hospital. Drying fish and a cow were found. The cow went with us and was destroyed the next morning prior toour rush to the rescue." ––––––––– 21 MAR 67 Co. A KIA: Spc4 Larry D. Barton (21) of Millersburg, OH perished in Tay Ninh Province. [Note: Some casualty reports state Larry was "(A3) Hostile [action], died while missing. Reason: Gun, small arms fire (ground casualty)." Larry was killed during the initial contact at Firebase Gold (Soui Tre) when pre-plotted 'counter mortar fire' was shot by the artillery at Gold – who were under attack – and landed amoungst the soldiers of Alpha.] ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• "On 21 March, 34 km northeast of Tay Ninh City at LZ "Gold", a battalion of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division engaged an estimated five enemy battalions. Two U.S. infantry battalions and an armored cavalry squadron reinforced. The enemy attempted to withdraw. The battle resulted in 631 enemy killed. U.S. casualties were 31 killed, 109 wounded." [Source: MACV Office of Information MACCI-P 16 April 1967 (Press Release) pg.8] 21 Mar (Tuesday) "JUNCTION CITY. 27 km NE Tay Ninh City, 0640H-1200H, en atkd 3d Bde 4th Inf Div arty elm w/82mm mort fire. At same time, a 3d Bde bn engaged 5 en bns (3,000 men). US reinf the 3d Bde bn. Mid-morning en began withdrawl to NE and SE. Arty and air atkd retreating en. From 1015H-1200H contact sporadic. 631 EK 196 wpns. Frd cas: 31 KIA 109 WIA. USAF 0-1 directing air strikes was downed by en ground fire and exploded on impact. Two crew KIA. USAF sptd opn w/117 direct spt sorties. Late afternoon in another area, a direct spt air strike by 2 USSAF F-100s w/FAC control resulted in 2 US KIA 10 US WIA." [Source: MACV Office of Information MACCI-P 16 April 1967 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS – MARCH 1967 pg. 13] ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• BATTLE OF SOUI TRE When a massive NVA / VC attack was launched against FSB Gold (XT385708) the 2/12th fought their way into the partially over-run firebase and counter attacked to restore its perimeter. For its actions, the 2/12th was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. Lawrence Greenberg wrote this about the battle in the, June 1991, Vietnam magazine; ".... the 272nd Regiment and U-80 Artillery attacked the base from all sides following a 650 round mortar attack. Waves of attackers advanced under recoilless rifle and rock- et fire and penetrated the southeast perimeter." 0640 hours FSB Gold attacked. 0655 hours 2/12th ordered to move to the relief of Gold. ³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³ "From the northwest, a company of the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry braved enemy mortar fire and the risk of ambushes and hacked its way through 1,500 meters of thick bamboo to reach the beleaguered camp at 0845. [Co. A. – Sarge] It charged into the base under covering fire from Gold's defenders and assumed responsibilty for the southwestern perimeter." [Source: MacGarrigle COMBAT OPERATIONS p. 565. NOTE: Map 15 on page 130 identifies "relief force" as Co. C 2/12th. I know that Co. A made the 1,500 meter drive through heavy bamboo – my question for you Suoi Tre vets is; where there other companies on the ground the day before and during the relief phase of the battle? – Sarge] ³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³ Extracts of the Recommendation and Award for the Presidential Unit Citation provided by Howard S. Paris (Flame 3), 2/12th's S-3 at the time of the Battle of Soui Tre. Howard said that Capt. Chris Stone, Charlie company's C.O., did most of the preparation for the Recommendation: HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION APO San Francisco 96268 AVDDC-CO 1 April 1967 SUBJECT: Recpmmendation for the Presidential Unit Citation THRU: Commanding General 25th Infantry Division APO SF 96225 THRU: Commanding General II Field Force APO SF 96266 TO: Commanding General United States Army, Viet Nam APO SF 96307 1. The Presidential Unit Citation is reccommended for the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, and all assigned and attached units (see Inclosure 2), for their actions on 21 March 1967. [Sarge's NOTE: Parts 2 through 7 deal with the early morning attack of 2,500 NVA / VC upon FB Gold – defended by a compliment of 450 U.S. Soldiers – well documented elsewhere in historys about Operation Junction City.] 8. Alerted at 0655 hours and ordered to move to the aid of the beleagured defenders of FSB Gold, the 2/12th Inf, 2/22d Inf (Mechanized), and the 2/34th Armor pressed on from positions as far away as 3,000 meters. [Sarge's NOTE: The Mech and Armor were working together some distance south of the 2/12th – who were working alone – some 1,500 meters due west of FSB Gold.] As they started to move, the 2d Bn 12th Inf was subjected to heavy concentrations of enemy mortar fire in an attempt to delay their progress. Treating their wounded on the move, the 2d Bn 12th Inf continued to push on through 2,500 meters of heavy bamboo and underbrush toward their objective at FSB Gold. Harrassed by sniper fire and blocked by security elements of the enemy's main attack force, the 2d Bn 12th continued to advance, moving the 2,500 meters overland through dense jungle against adetermined enemy in less than two hours. The first elements of the 2d Bn, 12th Inf entered the south-western part of the perimeter minutes before the mechanized elements arrived at 0900 hours. 10. Having been repulsed on their first attempt to overrun the FSB, the enemy mortared the objective once again and launched a second determined ground assault. This second assault was interrupted as mechanized columns of the 2/22d Inf (M) and foot elements of the 2/12th Inf almost simultaneously broke into the clearing at 0900 hours, trapping the enemy in a murderous cross fire. The 2/34th Armor was trailing, and swept immediately behind the mechaized battalion. Both the mechanized and armored elements passed through the 2d Bn, 12th Inf and swept around the southern and eastern half of the FSB while the enemy troops swarmed over the lead APC's. The heavy guns of the tanks were firing direct fire at point blank range into the teeming mass of troopsas the enemy panicked and attempted to flee. After the mechanized units assisted in breaking the force of the attack in the eastern and southern flanks, th 2d Bn, 12th Inf moved in on the west and northwest, sweeping the intire perimeter and neutralizing the small remaining pockets of resistance. The full force of available air and artillery support was brought to bear against the Viet Cong force which was now desperately tryin to break contact. 18. Analysis of the enemy actions of 21 March 1967 indicate an intent to conduct a ground attack against the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry immediately following the mortar attack on that unit. Only early committment of the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry prevented the ground attack. The entire movement of the battalion was subjected to continuous sniper fire from the north flank. The presence of the great numbers of anti-tank weapons futher indicate that the Viet Cong expected a quick "roll-up" of Fire Support Base Gold followed by an engagement with the mechanized forces. In spite of a heavy preponderance of automatic and anti-tankweapons, the Viet Cong force was so throughly defeated that the mechanized forces suffered only two slightly wounded personnel. Not oneM-113 armored personnel carrier or M48A3 tank was struck by anti-tank fire during the course of the engagment. ³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³

The Presidential Unit Citation is awarded by direction of the President of the United States THE 3D BRIGADE, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION and Assigned and Attached Units FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and the Attached and Assigned Units distinguished themselves by extraordinary heroism while engaged in military operations on 21 March 1967 in the vicinity of Suoi Tre, Republic of Viet Nam. The membersof this Brigade and the foregoing units demonstrated indomitable courage and professional skill while engaging an estimated force of 2,500 Viet Cong. During the early morning hours of 21 March 1967, an estimated force of 2,500 Viet Cong launched amassive and determined ground attack against elementsof the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry and 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery located at Fire Support Base Gold near Soui Tre, Republic of Viet Nam. Opening the engagement with an intense mortar attack, the enemy force, later identified as the 272d Main Force Regiment reinforced by two additionl infantry battalions, struck the perimeter in three separate locations. Due to the ferocity of the assault and the overwhelming number of enemy troops, untenable positions in the north and southeast were overrun within the first 30 minutes of the battle despite determined resistance by friendly forces. As the enemy penetrated the perimeter, the American troops set up an internim perimeter and continued to direct whithering fire on the enemy. When the Viet Cong directed anti-tank fire upon the artillery positions, heroic gun crews cannabalized parts from damaged guns, and, at several points, fired directly into the advancing enemy including the firing of "bee-hive" ammunition through gaps in the perimeter. While the battle continued to rage and grow in intensity, the Brigade Commander was directing the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mechanized) and the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, to the besieged fire support base. At the same time, the support and service elements of the brigade began a furious aerial resupply of ammunition and medical supplies from the Brigade Rear base camp at Dau Tieng. As the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry began its overland move to the fire support base approximately 2,500 meters distant, a heavy concentration of enemy mortar fire was directed upon their position, killing one man and wounding 20 others. Undaunted, the battalion moved nearly 2,500 meters in less than two hours despite constant blocking and harrassment efforts by the enemy. Concurrently with the movement of the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, mechanized and armor elements began moving across the Suoi Samat River at a ford which had only recently been located and which previously had been thought impassable. Driving towards the fire support base, the mechanized unit followed by the armor battalion, drove into the western sector of the engaged perimeter passing through engaged elements of the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry. Striking the Viet Cong on the flank, the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry smashed through the enemy with such intensity and ferocity that enemy attack faltered and broke. As the fleeing and now shattered enemy force retreated to the north-east, te 2d Battalion, 34th Armor swept the position destroying large numbers of Viet Cong who were now in full retreat. Throughout the battle, fighters of the United States Air Force, directed by the Brigade's Forward Air Controllers provided close support to the fire support base and hammered enemy concentrations outside the perimeter. As the FAC aircraft dived through heavy anti-aircraft fire to mark enemy positions, the plane was hit by ground fire and crashed, killing both occupants. After securing the fire support base, a sweep of the area was conducted, revealing a total of 647 Viet Cong bodies and 10 enemy captured. It is estimated that an additional 200 enemy were killed as a result of the aerial and artillery bombardment. Friendly casualties were extremely light, resulting in only 33 killed and 187 wounded of whom approximately 90 were returned to duty. Through their fortitude and determination, the personnel of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and attached units were able in great measure to cripple a large Viet Cong force. Their devotion to duty and extraordinary heroism reflect distinct credit upon themselves and the Armed Forces of the United States. ³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³ Co. C veteran (Sgt.) Les Cooper wrote "we were not mortared. They had spread each company out – we were the 'bait.'" "....we did the drive as did 'A' company. I can remember a radio call to the 'Z' notifying them we were coming in. I was the whole weapons squad for the 1st platoon, we were so short of people I had volunteered to cary the M60. I remember enering the LZ and tossing a hand grenade at the quad fifty – it had been over-run. Other than that I think I fired 4 or 5 hundred rounds, not sure I hit anything but it was supportive fire. You might check the number of wounded, number was increased by 'friendly fire' – no fire is friendly. I know the ones we had were." Co. A, 2/12th veteran Bill Comeau wrote of the reception that the "Warriors" recieved when they entered FSB Gold; "Artillerymen... ran out of their foxholes and threw thier arms around us with tears in their eyes." ³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³ LATTER IN VIETNAM: At a 19 May 1970 Commanders Conference, General Abrams saw Marshall Garth's name on a promotion list and mused "Garth had a brigade in the 4th Division, and I went out to Fort Lewis three times while the 4th Division was mobilizing and training out there.... and he had a brigade that had a cadre, and then they brought the fresh ex-civilians in there, and that's what that brigade was built of. And 11 months after they received the recruits – straight from civilian life, so all the basic training, advanced individual training, and so on was done right in the brigade – but 11 months after they got those men at Fort Lewis they were in this big battle up in War Zone C, that brigade, where they were attacked one morning about five or six o'clock by one of these regiments out of the 9th Division. And a tremendous battle. And this brigade really performed in a first-class way. And Garth was the commander from the start, and he was the commander in that battle. Very rare that a fellow gets to see the results of his training effort, you know." [Source: Sorley, VIETNAM CHRONICLES (a.k.a. "the Abrams Tapes") pg. 416]