Harbor Entrance Control Post

HECP

Last Update: 2175 Most of the information on this site comes from a historical study by Varoujan Karentz, Jamestown, RI. This study is entitled "Harbor Entrance Command Post; The HECP at Fort Burnside, Beavertail Point, Jamestown, RI (Conanicut Island)". Presented in April 2000 to the Jamestown Historical Society. Any Corrections, Additions or Comments are Welcome! Marty Dwyer; Martyk9 @ webtv.net NOTE: To send me an e-mail, please delete the two spaces in the above address. Thanks!

Prelude: The escalating war in Europe (World War II) created much concern about the protection of the numerous military facilities located on the US Coast. Ship movements through the passages into harbors required surveillance and control. Control stations which looked over these passages provided the ideal locations to detect and control ship passage, monitor possible underwater penetration by enemy submarines and to communicate surveillance status to Joint Army / Navy defense Installations.

HECP Mission Statement: H.R. Stark CNO / George Marshall CS 1. A Harbor Entrance Control Post ia a central point for the coordination and joint operation of the Army and Navy elements of the Harbor Defense System, whose mission is: MISSION - To collect and disseminate information of activities in the defensive sea area; to control unescorted commercial shipping in the defensive sea area; and to take prompt and decisive action to operate the elements of the Harbor defense; in order to deny enemy action within the defensive coastal area. 2. This post is visualized as one continuously manned by an Officer of both the Army and Navy and the necessary assisting personnel for clerical and communication duties, where the Army and Navy Officers are the Senior Local Commander of their respective services, or their direct representatives with authority to take the action necessary to accomplish the mission as stated above. 3. When the Army or Navy Officer on duty at the Harbor Entrance ControlPost is a representative of the Local Senior Commander, his authority will have to be defined by the Senior Officer whom he represents, whose judgement must be based upon the task which is to be accomplished as expressed in the mission. 4. The idel location for such a post is one which will command a complete view of the harbor approaches and the harbor itself. The idel housing is to place it in the same building with the Army's Harbor Defense Command Post. Neither of these idels can probably be uniformly realized at all points where HECPs will be established. 5. Each HECP should be equipped with a chart room where information relative to enemy activities or other activities which are potentially important, may be plotted on a graph or situation map of the defensive coastal area; and with all of the communication facilities necessary to receive and disseminate information and to communicate with the elements of the harbor defense system. Wherever it is practicable it seems desireable, in order to eliminate as much communication installation as possible, to place in the HECP building a receiving station for underwater listening posts, indicator loops and sonio-buoys and a visual signal station. This arrangement expresses an ideal which also probably cannot be uniformly realized, but to whatever extent such arrangement is practicable, it seems desireable to made it so.

World War II Preparations On 27 June 194, President Franklin D. Roosevelt involked the "Espionage Act of 1917" to govern the anchorage and movement of all vessels in the United States waters and to protect vessels, harbors and waters of the US. This was the beginning of Port Security activities in the US for WW 2. Then on 2 October 1941, just prior to the US entering WW 2, Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, directed the Eastern, Western and Southern Defense Commands to plan HECP deployments for the protection of strategic harbors and prepare specific mission requirements for each area. Seventeen key locations in the continental US were selected. By 20 Dec 1941, he issued orders placing all HECPs on a war basis. Joint Army and Navy plans were prepared and implimented. There were four categories of HECPs defined, A, B, C and D. Only two sites were designated an "A", signifying the highest level mission complexity. In addition to the control of shipping and harbor surveillance, the HECP was alo tasked with maintaining a navigable entrance into harbors by preventing enemy ships from laying mines or scuttling themselves to block harbor entrances and to ward-off Axis motor torpedo boats.

Harbor Entrance Control Post No.*.HD ................... Fort / Area ....Class. .. 01 Portland ................ Ft Williams ......... ? 02 Portsmouth ............ Ft Stark ..............? 03 Boston .................. Ft Dawes ............ ? 04 New Bedford œ ...... Gooseberry Neck .? ..1941 - 1943 04 New Bedford ......... Mishaum Point ....? .. 1943 - 1945 05 Narraganset Bay .. Ft Burnside ......... ? . 1941 - 1943 05 Narraganset Bay .. Ft Burnside ......... A . 1943 - 1945 06 LongIslandSound . Mt Prospect ........ ? 07 NY ...................... Ft Wadsworth ...... ? 08 Delaware ............. Ft Miles .............. ? 09 ChesepeakeBay .. Ft Story ............... ? 10 Charleston .......... Ft Moultrie ........... ? 11 Key West ............ Ft Taylor .............. ? 12 Pensacola ........... Ft Pickens ............ ? 13 Galveston ............ Ft San Jucinto ...... ? 14 San Diego ........... Ft Rosecram W. .... ? 15 Los Angeles ......... Fr MacArthur ......... ? 16 San Francisco ...... Ft Scott ................. ? 17 Columbia ............. Ft Stevens ............ ? 18 Puget Sound ,...... Ft Worden ............ ? 18 Puget Sound ....... Striped Point ......... ?

Outside the Continental US 19 Sitka ................... Makhnati Island .....? 20 Pearl Harbor ........ Navy Yard ............ ? 21 Cristobal .............. Ft Sherman .......... ? 22 Balboa ................. Ft Amador ............ ? 23 San Juan .............. Ft Brooke ............. ? 24 Roosevelt Rds ....... Punta Algodones .. ? 25 Manila Bay ............ Ft Mills ................ ?

* Numbers are assigned for this list and, do not represent any Harbor Defense tactical assignment. Originally 17 were authorized. One of the 18 must have been an add-on to the original 17. § New Bedford has not shown up in other listings and may have been the additional one. Its importance was the protection of the southwestern entrance to the Cape Cod Canal. (Marty) Where there are 2 indicated for a Harbor Defense, this indicates that the Facility was re-located for more effective operations.

Harbor Entrance Observation Post A Harbor Defense was authorized only one HECP. Instances arose, due to several harbors size or configuration, where a single installation could not provide proper control for arriving or departing traffic. The authorization was loop-holed by establishing additional Harbor Entrance Observation Stations (HEOP) that were in direct communications with the HECP. The following list locates where these were established:

No...HD .................... Fort / Area ....Class. .. 06 LongIslandSound . Fort Terry ....... ...... 06 LongIslandSound . Fort Mikie ...... ...... 06 LongIslangSound . Camp Hero .... ...... 07 NY ...................... Fort Tilden ..... ...... 07 NY ...................... Fort Hancock ... ...... 09 Chesapeake Bay .. Fort Story ....... ....... 12 Pensacola ............ Fort Pickens ... ...... Where there are 2 or more listings at a HD, they could have existed at the same time.

Operation Sceanario: There were many rules and detailed procedures established to insure proper recognition of either military warships or merchant ships and their entry into harbors. The level of coordination, training and plans can only be under-estimated. Any unexpected arrival, unusual features of ship's superstructure, crew appearance, delayed arrival or incorrect signals all contributed to concerns of enemy deception. "Suspicious Vessels" rules and procedures were extensive and detailed. Gun batteries were trained immediately on a suspect vessel, and the vessel was ordered to stop until an examining Officer boarded, removed all doubt and notified the HECP on what he found. When an unidentified vessel entered the defensive sea area, the hECP would direct a visual challange by blinker light or signal flags. If an immediate response to the proper code were not received, the HECP was tasked to organize offensive measures to attack the threat. If surveillance radar indicated that a surface ship was approaching at night, the area would be illuminated with searchlights, and a warning shot could be fired from the examination battery. If the intruder failed to stop, other batteries could open fire, sinking the ship if necessary. If the intruder did stop, a patrol boat would would be dispatched with a boarding Officer to investigate.

If underwater detection equipment detected a vessel and no surface ship was spotted by visual or electronic means, an enemy submarine was presumed to be attempting to penetrate. Allied submarines were required to enter harbors on the surface. If penetration was suspected, any friendly vessels aproaching the harbor would be advised to stay clear. Patrol boats would be notified, the submarine net gates would remain closed and the minefields would be switched from 'safe" to "ARMED" For the purpose of additional validation and confirmation regarding the identity of targets, the HECP was provided with ship and aircraft recognition books and tables including "Jane's All the World Fighting Ships and Aircraft" and "Lloyds Register of Ships". All land communications to various defense command locations from and to the HECP were conducted by a network of landline ( wire ) telephones, backed up by two-way radio equipment. Flashing lights (blinker) and flag signals were used to communicate with ships as necessary.

Staffing: While most HECPs were located on Army Installations, the HECP was a joint Army and Navy operation with the Navy technically in command. The HECP Officer-in-Charge was always a Navy Lieutenant Commader. The Army officers and men assigned to the HECP were a combination of National Guard, Army draftees and Regular Army. Each gun battery provided one man as an observer for each shift plus one supervisor was provided from the Battalion Headquarters. This enabled each observer to communicate with his own unit. The senior NCO was responsible for the requisitioning of the observers, assigning them to shifts, supervising them and training them on Ship and Aircraft recognition. In the event of action, the Commander, Intelligence Officer and the Operations Duty Officer were located at dest with telephones in front of the plotting board. A Naval officer reported underwater intelligence information from Naval Magnetic Loop Receiving Stations, if present within the harbor defenses, and represented the local Naval Installations. Underwater cable surveillance room was off-limits to Army personnel. Indeed, access was never granted to any area within the hECP to anyone who did not work in that area. Non-essential talking to other area personnel, including Army to Navy, was discouraged. Underwater and surface surveillance and tracking systems supplemented with radio, visual sgnaling devices and telephones were operated within the HECP. It was the responsibility of the hECP and its duty Officer to guide friendly vessels safely in and out of the harbor and to detect an enemy's attempt to penetrate.

The HECP coordinated the harbor defenses, identifying targets, recommending them to specific gun batteries. Observers and spotters for some of the batteries provided range and azimuths. Later, radar and range information supplimented the visual observers during periods of poor visibility. When war broke out in December of 1941, personnel who had been inducted into the National Guard had to pass new physical requirements. Men with severe physical limitations were discharged. As the war progressed, officers and men were shifted through many times to take the most fit and competent for assignments to units in training for overseas deployment. Younger officers were replaced by older men shipped in from distant post. Soldiers with minor disabilities, unfit for combat, were assigned as observers and replacements for men who were physically fit. Beginning in 1944, as the enemy threat diminished, substantial numbers of soldiers from Harbor Defense Sites were assigned to Field Artillery units destined for overseas. Although these personnel reductions affected gun battery efficiency, the HECP still mantained a high level of proficience controlling traffic. At the same time, upgraded aircraft and blimp capabilities increasingly supported the coastal gun batteries by providing early warning of targets approaching the defended area.

HECP Effectiveness: The value of the extensive defenses controlled by the HECP, and their ability to deter enemy ships and submarines from entering harbors may never be fully calculated. The US Navy, in 1944, reported that the value of underwater surveillance "is evident from the fact that not one effective penetration into any harbor, anywhere, guarded by the US harbor detection equipmet had been made since the midget Japanese submarine sipped into Pearl Harbor on 7 Deember 1941. (Several equipment detections of penetration are listed in the War Diary's of various CD Frontiers. As no damage occured or other evidence was found, it was assumed that equipment malfunctions or operator error(s) occured. Even as late as 1987, Air Defense Radar systems occasionally detected objects traveling 3,000 mph [on one occurance]). It is not known to what extent, knowledge of the HECPs and their associated coast defense commands deterred German military strategist. Clearly, however, the thousands of militay personnel who spent endless hours of boring vigils in the un-glamorous task of surveillance, provided security. The US Navy has proclaimed that no Axis vessels were detected closer than 3000 feet from any harbor entrance during WW 2. The Americam coast defense, in general terms, was widely known, even before the war. Although information on direct deployment and the new developments were carefully kept secret during the war, the fact that American harbors were ready, willing and able to defend themselves was common knowledge to enemy forces.

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