Sign at Camp Hale, Colorado where the 601st & 602nd Field Artillery trained

This site is the 5th of 9 web sites in which I have put together the history of the 601st Field Artillery Battalion (Pack). If you came across this site, and have not seen the other sites, pertaining to the 601st, please click on the links below. I'm receiving new information weekly, so keep checking back. Below, you will also find a link to the 602nd Field Artillery Battalion (Pack). This was the sister battalion to the 601st.

This site last updated 5-18-2011

To contact me, Dennis Cutter masterofneon2@msn.com or neonmaster@webtv.net NOTE: If you should write, please put 601st or 602nd in the subject box of the e-mail, otherwise it may be deleted as spam / junk mail. Thanks!

The Kiska Invasion 15 August 1943 Although the occupation of Kiska was achieved without enemy opposition, it nevertheless was conducted under combat conditions until the landing was well underway. Considerably larger forces were allotted to the assult on Kiska than had been used at Attu, since the garrison of the former island was known to have been several times as large as Attu's. The landing force consisted of 34,426 troops, 5,300 of whom were Canadian. Ships involved were three battleships, one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, nineteen destroyers, five attack transports, one attack cargo vessel, ten transports, three cargo vessels, one fast transport, fourteen LSTs, nine LCI(L)s, two light minelayers, three fast minesweepers, two tugs, one harbor tug, and one surveying ship. Potential air strength was 24 heavy bombers, 44 medium bombers, 28 dive bombers, 60 fighters, and 12 patrol bombers. Command of the attack force was vested in Admiral Rockwell, while Maj. Gen. C.H. Corlett was to command the landing force. Supreme command was again in the hands of Thomas C. Kinkaid, who had been promoted to Vice Admiral. As soon as success at Attu was assured, plans for the attack on Kiska were placed in work. In this case it was possible for shore party and fire control party personnel with experience at Attu to be sent to California for training exercises. The troops eventually employed, consisted of the 17th Infantry, 53d Infantry, 87th Mountain Infantry, 184th Infantry, First Special Service Force, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, and headquarters troops. The 601st Field Artillery Battalion (Pack) and the 602nd Field Artillery Battalion (Pack). The 17th Infantry was to be returned to Adak from Attu, where the 159th would replace it. The 53rd Infantry was a composite group organized in Alaska. The 87th Mountain Infantry reported at Fort Ord, California on 19 June 1943, along with the two artillery battalions. The 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade assembled on Vancouver Island between 1 and 15 June.

Handbook given out to the men before the invasion

With the exception of the 17th Infantry, most of these units had had no significant amphibious training. The First Special Service Force, however, consisted of about 1,800 men especially trained in commando tactics, rubber boat handling, and parachuting. While the majority of the men involved were to receive preliminary training outside the Alaskan area, experience at Attu had shown that it was essential for troops unfamiliar with the Aleutian terrain to have at least two weeks' training in the area itself.

The plans for the assult proper were approved on 19 July 1943, by Admiral Kinkaid. The 87th Mountain Infantry conducted training exercises at San Diego and Fort Ord under the supervision of Admiral Rockwell and General Corlett, while the Commanding General, Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet (Maj. Gen. Holland M. Smith, USMC) and his staff, conducted the training in the Adak area. On 22 July, Admiral Rockwell and General Corlett left San Francisco in the Grant, which had been fitted as an advanced command post for the landing force commander. (Admiral Rockwell's flagship, the Pennsylvania, which was being refitted as a headquarters ship, was not to be ready until 3 August). The target date had been set as 15 August, but at a conference of all ranking officers at Adak on 30 July, it was decided to delay D-day until the 24th, because of the need for further training and regrouping of battalion combat teams. This decision was not acceptable to CINCPAC, so D-day was again designated as 15 August and H-hour as 0630. It was believed that the main enemy positions had been laid out to meet attack from the south and east. An interesting plan was evolved to capitalize on this concentration of defensive power. Major fire support was to be delivered from the south and east against known Japanese gun positions. Simultaneously one transport group was to make a feint from the south. The actual landings, however, were to be made on the north and west side of the island, facing our major fire support. The initial landings were to take place on the north side of the central portion of the island, preceded by night landings by the 1st Special Service Force, which was directed to seize high ground to the southward of the beaches. On D-day plus 1, new beachheads were to be secured on the west side of the northern part of Kiska. This later operation was to be carried out by transports which had previously conducted the demonstration on the southern side of the island. Most of the heavier ships which had conducted the bombardments of 22 July and 2 August were to operate to the south and west of Kiska and Attu to cover the landing. On 13 August both transport groups departed from Adak for Kiska. At 1700 they were followed by the Pennsylvania, Idaho, Tennessee, Santa Fe, and their screens.

1